Check that Cairn images are genuine
Every Cairn release image is scanned for known vulnerabilities and signed, so you can prove it was built by the project's own release pipeline. platformctl checks the signature for you on every install and update. Nothing needs to be set in the portal.
What happens by default
When you run sudo platformctl provision or sudo platformctl update, platformctl checks the signatures of the API and portal images before it installs them.
| Situation | Default | With PLATFORM_VERIFY_IMAGES=strict |
|---|---|---|
| The signature is valid | continue | continue |
| The image has no signature | warning, continue | stop |
| The signature could not be checked | warning, continue | stop |
| The signature is invalid | stop | stop |
The cosign tool is not installed |
warning, continue | warning, continue |
To require a signature on every install:
sudo PLATFORM_VERIFY_IMAGES=strict platformctl update
Check an image yourself
Install cosign (the signing tool), then:
cosign verify \
--certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/Mpratyush54/server-automation/\.github/workflows/.*' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
ghcr.io/mpratyush54/platform-api:<tag>
The same command works for platform-portal, platform-stack and the platformctl copy on GHCR.
To see the list of components inside an image (its SBOM, a software bill of materials):
cosign verify-attestation \
--type cyclonedx \
--certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/Mpratyush54/server-automation/\.github/workflows/.*' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
ghcr.io/mpratyush54/platform-api:<tag>
Block unsigned images in the cluster (optional)
You can also make the cluster itself refuse unsigned Cairn images. This uses Kyverno, a policy engine for Kubernetes. It is not installed by default because it needs about 200 MB and suits larger installs.
Install it with the full profile:
export PLATFORM_PROFILE=full export INSTALL_KYVERNO=true sudo -E platformctl provision --autoOn a running server you can use
sudo -E platformctl install kyvernoinstead.It starts in Audit mode: unsigned pods are reported, not blocked. Review the Kyverno policy reports.
When the reports are clean, switch to blocking:
export KYVERNO_POLICY_MODE=Enforce sudo -E platformctl install kyverno
How it works
Release pipeline
| Workflow | What it does |
|---|---|
docker-build.yml |
Build, then Trivy scan (fails on a CRITICAL finding that has a fix; exceptions in .trivyignore), SARIF upload, CycloneDX SBOM, then cosign sign and attest |
publish-stack.yml |
cosign sign platform-stack:<version>-<arch> |
release-platformctl.yml |
cosign sign the platformctl OCI artifact on GHCR |
scan-third-party-images.yml |
Weekly Trivy scan of the images in platformctl/internal/images/images.txt (results as a private artifact and job summary only) |
Signing is keyless: cosign uses the GitHub Actions OIDC identity of the workflow instead of a stored key. Pull requests build and scan the images but never push or sign them.
Exceptions live in .trivyignore. Every CVE line must have an expiry date and a short reason in a comment.
platformctl check
platformctl runs cosign verify with the identity above (platformctl/internal/verify/verify.go) on the API and portal images, with a 2-minute time limit. A missing cosign binary is always only a warning, so offline installs still work.
Kyverno policy
The ClusterPolicy verify-platform-images requires keyless cosign signatures on ghcr.io/mpratyush54/* images for pods in the platform namespace. KYVERNO_POLICY_MODE picks Audit (default) or Enforce.
Optional CVE policy. INSTALL_KYVERNO_CVE_POLICY=true adds a ClusterPolicy that expects Trivy Operator VulnerabilityReport objects in the platform namespace with spec.summary.critical: 0. platformctl does not install Trivy Operator. To use this:
- Install Trivy Operator yourself (Helm chart), with resource limits that fit the node.
- Set
INSTALL_KYVERNO_CVE_POLICY=trueand runplatformctl install kyvernoagain. - Keep
.trivyignoreas the allowlist with expiry dates. Do not silence CRITICAL findings in Enforce mode without a dated reason.
Sign and enforce your own app images
You can use the same approach for your own apps in their project namespaces, without changing Cairn's own policy.
- Sign your images in your own CI (keyless cosign with your workflow identity).
- Apply a namespaced Kyverno
Policy(not a ClusterPolicy), for example:
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: Policy
metadata:
name: verify-tenant-images
namespace: my-app
spec:
validationFailureAction: Audit
background: true
rules:
- name: verify-tenant-ghcr
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds: [Pod]
verifyImages:
- imageReferences:
- "ghcr.io/example-org/my-app*"
attestors:
- entries:
- keyless:
subject: "https://github.com/example-org/my-app/.github/workflows/*"
issuer: "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
rekor:
url: https://rekor.sigstore.dev
required: true
- Change
validationFailureActiontoEnforceonce Audit looks clean.
For developers: policy tests
kyverno test platformctl/internal/manifests/data/kyverno-tests
CI runs the same suite in security.yml.